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Chapter pages in book: (p. 40 - 44)tion of guarantees of defense loans, and by roughly the same amount that
Reserve bank credit increased. There was a sharp contrast between the
reduction in the net advances of central banking credit in 1945—46 and
1948—49, in an effort to curb price inflation, and the large annual
increases in federal loans and loan insurance outstanding. Since 1949
the two series have followed quite similar courses.
Thus, on the whole, the movements of federal loan and loan insurance
policy were even less well correlated with monetary than with fiscal policy.
Such a divergence might be defensible under some circumstances, of
course, but the record reveals defects in federal monetary policies as well
as inadequacies in the management of the lending and loan insurance
programs, from the standpoint of economic stability.
In short, comparisons (1) between federal credit activities and fiscal
and central banking activities, and (2) between all of these federal finan-
cial operations and business cycle behavior give a checkered result. The
principal generalization that appears warranted by the investigations is
that diversity of movement and lack of counter-cyclical coordination have
characterized federal financial operations in the past.
One characteristic of federal credit programs has been that, once set in
motion, they tended, in the aggregate, to expand, regardless of general
economic conditions. Aggregate federal loans and loan insurance con-
tinued to rise through the late thirties and early forties during economic
recession and expansion alike. The most important imstabilizing effects
were experienced during the post-World War II boom, when, largely as
a result of federal' insurance and guarantee of home mortgage loans,
federal credit operations worked counter to federal fiscal and monetary
policies. The authors give this explanation:
Aggregate federal credit is a mosaic of many pieces: each par-
ticular program has been designed to accomplish some special purpose
and has been managed with that end in view, often without regard to its
effects on over-all economic stability. Yet in the aggregate the programs
have at times exerted a profound influence on prices-and production."
Effects on Allocation of Resources
Because of the many other, and more important influences at work, the
effect exerted by federal credit programs on the allocation of resources is
subtle and difficult to trace. Still, the investigators were able to identify
certain changes in employment and output, prices, incomes and financial
position of producers, and regional shifts in economic, activity, which
seem attributable to the operations of the federal credit programs.
40In agriculture, by increasing the supply of credit and reducing its costs,
federal credit programs probably maintained a larger allocation of
resources to farms than would otherwise have occurred. The consequent
increase in the supply of agricultural products may have reduced some-
what the percentage of national income received by farmers when, as in
the 1930's, demand was not active. The chief effects of federal credit pro-
grams on increasing farm output probably occurred through the expansion
in Land Bank lending in 1934—35, and through the later expansion in
production credit and rural electrification, especially in the post-World
War Il period.
The Land Bank program introduced and encouraged long-term amor-
tized mortgage lending at relatively low interest rates, and helped to pro-
tect farmer ownership by the large-scale refinancing program of 1934 and
1935. Most of the funds lent by the Farm Security Administration and
the Farmers Home Administration were used for purchasing farms, and in
later years for farm enlargement and improvement. The biggest part of
these funds went to southern states. Among the borrowers under the.
Farmers Home Administration program, it was found that increases in
output, income, and net worth were greater than the national averages for
farmers.
Produètion. and subsistence loans, or rehabilit'ation loans, represented
the greatest part of the Farmers Home Administration program, and no
doubt have had important effects on the income and bargaining position
of the borrowing farmers. These loans were intended to help low-income
farmers build up their productive assets and living necessities so that
labor and management skills could be used more effectively. Evidence
indicates considerable success in enabling such borrowers eventually to
qualify for private credit.
Provision through the REA program of central-station electric power
has facilitated the technological revolution in agriculture, extending the
base for the profitable employment of borrowed funds, and thus indirectly
affecting farm output. The southern and midwestern areas received the
niajor part of the REA credit granted.
Farm credit aids have brought about a greater uniformity of credit
costs, and thus may have shifted resources to regions where costs of
private credit have been highest and bankruptcies most frequent —the
Old South and the Great Plains.
In business, federal credit has played so small a role (compared to
private financing) that it probably has. not had much direct effect on
aggregate employment and production. Through 1941 the ratio of federal
business credit to total corporate debt never rose much above 1 per cent.
41At its highest, in 1943 and 1949, it was only 3 per cent. A mild upward
trend can, however, be observed.
It seems likely that federal:credit aids to agriculture and housing have
had more influence, indirectly, on business markets and employment than
have the programs directly serving business.
For financial institutions, loans of government agencies were more
important from 1932 to 1940 than their borrowing from private sources.
However, by 1950 this public debt had been retired, except for some $800
million outstanding to savings and loan associations. Public holdings of
stocks and shares of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions were considerable in the late thirties and early
forties, but by 1953 this investment had also largely been retired.
The authors conclude that, in the aggregate, "federal credit to business
has not been large enough to exert important over-all effects on employ-
ment and production, on the formation of new enterprises, on the size of
the business population, or on the average asset-and-liability structure of
American enterprise; and effect of governmental influence on the stability
of the supply of business credit has been through aid to lending institutions
rather than to business directly."
But federal lending programs have had a selective effect on the alloca-
tion of economic resources through aid to particular types of business
concerns.
First, federal agencies provided significant assistance to a few ëstab-
lished industries considered essential to national, security —i.e.railroad
transportation, ocean shipping, foreign trade. Second, federal help has
been used to stimulate investment in new firms and new industries. The
RFC made many loans to firms in relatively unfamiliar lines that were
unable to obtain private credit because the risks could not be gauged.
Examples are loans to motels, fresh-frozen food canning and packing
finns, petro-chemical firms, and food locker enterprises.
Newly established and very small firms have been assisted through
VA guarantees of private loans, and through financing by the RFC, the
Federal Reserve Banks, and the Smaller War Plants 'Corporation. Com-
mercial banks usually consider such loans too risky, but federal credit
aid to such enterprises has loosened up the private credit market by help-
ing to familiarize commercial banks with this type of lending operation.
Third, federal agencies have carried on "marginal" financing of firms
which were financially weak but appeared to have reasonable prospects of
success, and of firms whose rapid growth had outstripped their financial
resources. Marginal financing was provided by Federal Reserve. Bank
loans, by RFC, and in many cases by the guarantees of war production
42loans made by the War and Navy Departments and by the U.S. Maritime
Commission.
The principal objective of federal housing credit programs since 1934
has been to increase the volume of construction. How successful has this
effort been?
To get at the answer, three important ways in which federal loan insur-
ance may stimulate construction were considered:
1.Loan insurance can increase the willingness of builders to
invest by reducing the equity required and by raising their
expectations as to the salability of the final product;
2. Loan insurance should increase the willingness of lenders
to invest in mortgages, other things being equal.
3.Loan insurance can widen the financing market and help
reduce down payments and carrying charges.
Two important periods were examined critically: the years immediately
after the enactment of the National Housing Act in 1934, when a deter-
mined effort was made to revive the construction industry through credit
programs, and the years following World War II, when a no less deter-
mined effort was made to increase construction by the provision of liberal
mortgage credit.
The weight of evidence is that in the thirties neither the loan insurance
program for home modernization and repair nor the home mortgage
insurance program played an initiating role in the recovery in construc-
tion expenditures. Both, however, contributed to an increase in construc-
tión activity once recovery was under way —inthe first case, modestly;
in the second, to an unknown degree.
After World War II,. liberal credit terms were made available to home
buyers through FHA and VA home mortgage insurance, and Federal
National Mortgage Association purchases of home mortgages from pri-
vate lenders. The question whether these liberal terms produced a higher
level of housing output than would otherwise have been achieved is com-
plex. A comparison of the home building booms that followed World Wars
I and IIafter allowance for changes in. population and rates of family
formation —stronglysuggests that residential construction was actually
less after World War II than would have been expected 'on the basis of
post-World War I experience.
The primary effect ofcredit liberalization program in this period
was apparently to be found in construction costs and housing prices. After
43the war, construction costs rose significantly more than costs of other
types of output; androsemore for home construction than for commercial
and factory construction. The main cause lay in more rapid increases in
prices of building materials, particularly of lumber, than Of semi-manu-
factured goods generally. The result was that the prices of houses increased
more rapidly than the prices of consumer goods generally, and certainly
of consumer durable goods. Thus, a considerable part of the impact of
the federal housing credit programs after 1946 was raising the costs of
residential construction and the prices of homes above what would other-
wise have prevailed.
Some other effects of federal credit aids to housing from the thirties to
the fifties were: promotion of a decrease in the average size of homes and
in the number of rooms per home, a trend in keeping with urbanization
and the decline in average family size up to World War II; second, stimu-
lation of multi-unit projects developed on a cooperative ownership basis;
and third, increases in the scale of operation of home building enterprises,
which raised production efficiency.
Effects on Credit Markets and Lending Practices
Federal credit aids have modified the markets, practices, and economic
functions of the private financial system in profound and enduring ways.
Indeed, it seems probable that the institutional effects of federal credit
programs have been more important than their effect either on aggregate
economic activity or on allocation of resources.
In agriculture, federal credit aids lengthened maturities, liberalized
terms of credit, and tended to increase the size of the average farm mort-
gage loan. They also worked toward greater uniformity in both mortgage
and production credit costs throughout the nation, bringing the largest
relative reductions in the costs of farm credit in the South and West.
Federal Land Banks functioned as leaders in farm mortgage markets, set-
ting terms and conditions that private lenders were compelled to meet if
they were to retain their positions in the market. To a lesser degree, the
production credit associations have likewise been. aggressive market
leaders in the field of production credit, encroaching upon the markets
formerly served exclusively by nongovernmental lenders. In part, com-
mercial banks and life insurance companies have yielded market position
to the publicly sponsored agencies; in part, however, they have met the
increasingly liberal terms with loans carrying lower interest charges and
longer maturities. These effects of federal lending on farm credit markets
occurred mainly during a long period of decline in the structure of interest
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